alternatives can be introduced either through the codification of common law rules, or, more emphatically still, through legislative activity that selfconsciously limits the scope of contractual freedom. Yet, once these statutes are on the books, the ability and inclination of judges to return to common law precedents is severely limited. Codes and statutes are normally conceived of as self-contained bodies of law, and their sound explication depends only in part on the common law principles that these codes and statutes were designed to displace. In a world of statutory compromises and administrative intrigue, general principles are harder to articulate, and paradoxically, less important as well. No one pretends that the latest variation in a consumer credit statute is the outgrowth of the enduring principles of common law. To master the operation of the statute, it is necessary to begin with its text, and often to pursue the regulations passed to construe the elaborate compromises that led to its passage. This process necessarily precludes any reliance, explicit or implicit, on the decisions of English judges.
English cases are also less important in the United States because of differences in our two constitutional structures. In England, Parliament is the boss, and whatever it says goes, so long as it says it clearly-which it can, at least to the satisfaction of English judges. American judges do not play second fiddle to the legislature, but reserve the power under both federal and state law to declare state laws unconstitutional. This difference in judicial authority has led to a difference in ways of thinking. English judges are reticent to look at the policies behind statutes whose commands they understand: plain meaning as a canon of construction, indeed as a way of life, has lasted much longer in England than in this country. Given our capacious Constitution, American judges feel free, and indeed compelled, to look at these ultimate policies in order to see whether a challenged statute squares with some constitutional provision of broad generality, be it on the enduring verities of speech, religion, property, due process, or equal protection. The habits of mind that American judges cultivated in their constitutional role often carry over to their common law work: after all, what judge will be content to follow common law precedent when the grander constitutional styles of litigation have become customary. As the patterns of judicial thinking appear to change, so the separation between the American legal system and its English forbears continues apace.
In some sense, I view these trends with genuine regret. My own legal education began in the mid-1960s with a law degree from Oxford, where my course of study began not with English but Roman Law. I was steeped in the learning of the great English judges of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, because older precedents tended to hold on longer in a unitary jurisdiction that followed (as England did then) a strict principle of stare decisis. No one would believe me if I said that a Yale Law School education removed whatever affection I had for English law before I entered teaching. And it did not. But there is now, happily, some reason to think that once again we have an interest in English law, Broadly speaking, Bramwell's career falls into two separate stages. First, when principles of laissez faire were in the ascendancy, Bramwell showed the buoyant optimism of his age and assumed the mantle of one of the leading spokesmen of intelligent reform. Having established his reputation as a special pleader at the bar, he took active part in the dismantling of the older system of pleading and procedure as a member of the Common Law Procedure Commission, whose work was translated into law with the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852.3 Ten years later, he was active on a second commission that consolidated the English company, or as we say, corporate law, which resulted in the passage of the varied achievements and reforms that were in large part driven by the same philosophical principle that animated his decision in the cases. Finally, while I am happy to quarrel with Bramwell on points of detail and application, I count myself as his defender both for his common law decisions and the larger political philosophy that animated them.
To speak of this divergence of opinion, however, is to put the cart before the horse. The preliminary inquiry is, why the renewed interest in Baron Bramwell in the first place? To my mind, the explanation depends on many of the factors set out above. The development of twentieth century law has not proved wholly satisfactory even to its defenders. The growth of statutory law has lead us away from questions of first principle, and from questions of political morality. Whatever the weakness of Baron Bramwell, he confronted just these questions in a blunt and uncompromising way. His opinions may be less authoritative than those of modem American judges, but usually they are less verbose and less labored; they are also more provocative, more informative, and more jurisprudential. In addition, we have entered, I think, a new phase of political life. Refutations of laissez faire still fill the air. Much of the intense passion about its ostensible injustices continues to burn bright. But there is this difference. Critics of laissez faire are no longer as cocky about the present alternatives. The size of government continues to grow; the plate of positive rights becomes even fuller; the dominance of this new wave of thinking is almost unchallenged in popular circles. Yet, there is an increasing sense of disappointed expectations, a sense that the brave new legal order is not able to deliver the prosperity, peace, and contentment that it once so freely promised. And try as one may, it becomes harder with each passing year to point an accusing finger at the bygone heyday of laissez faire, for so long cast as the villain of the piece. More immediate explanations dominate remote ones, and we must attribute at least some of the failings of our own times to contemporary policies and not to some ill-defined legacy of a bygone era. Perhaps the critics are overhasty, and laissez faire contained a core of good sense, perhaps more than modern writers want to acknowledge.
With our doubts about our own jurisprudence, it is perhaps natural to turn to the masters of a bygone age to see whether our generation, too, should follow in the footsteps of its immediate predecessors and repudiate the doctrines that held sway over much of the nineteenth century. The reader will have to be the judge of whether the renewed interest in Baron Bramwell represents an important change in intellectual direction, or a passing fancy that will be quickly forgotten as legal scholars once again turn to business as usual in the welfare state.
